The Way People Lie in Markets

Chloe Tergiman and Marie Claire Villeval
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Chloe Tergiman: Penn State - Pennsylvania State University - Penn State System

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: In a finitely repeated game with asymmetric information, we experimentally study how reputation and standard market mechanisms change the nature of fraudulent announcements by experts. While some lies can be detected ex post by investors, other lies remain deniable. Lying behavior suggests that individuals care more about the consequences of being caught, rather than the act of lying per se. Allowing for reputation reduces the frequency of lies that can be detected but has no impact on deniable lies: individuals simply hide their lies better and fraud persists. Competition without reputation increases risky lies and never protects investment.

Keywords: Dishonesty; Reputation; Competition; Financial Markets; Experiment JEL codes: C91; D01; G41; M21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mst
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02292040v2
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The way people lie in markets (2020)
Working Paper: The way people lie in markets (2020)
Working Paper: The Way People Lie in Markets (2019)
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