Externalities in the games over electrical power transmission networks

Dávid Csercsik and László Kóczy ()

No 1125, CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Abstract: An electrical transmission network consists of producers, consumers and the power lines connecting them. We build an ideal (lossless) DC load flow model as a cooperative game over a graph with the producers and consumers located at the nodes, each described by a maximum supply or desired demand and the power lines represented by the edges, each with a given power transmission capacity and admittance value describing its ability to transmit electricity. Today's transmission networks are highly interconnected, but organisationally partitioned into several subnetworks, the so-called balancing groups with balanced production and consumption. We study the game of balancing group formation and show that the game contains widespread externalities that can be both negative and positive. We study the stability of the transportation network using the recursive core. While the game is clearly cohesive, we demonstrate that it is not necessarily superadditive. We argue that subadditivity may be a barrier to achieve full cooperation. Finally the model is extended to allow for the extension of the underlying transmission network.

Keywords: Energy transmission networks; Cooperative game theory; Partition function form games; Externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 L14 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-gth and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econ.core.hu/file/download/mtdp/MTDP1125.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to econ.core.hu:80 (A connection attempt failed because the connected party did not properly respond after a period of time, or established connection failed because connected host has failed to respond.)

Related works:
Working Paper: Externalities in the games over electrical power transmission networks (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:has:discpr:1125

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nora Horvath ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).