Do People Who Care About Others Cooperate More? Experimental Evidence from Relative Incentive Pay

Pablo Hernandez-Lagos, Dylan Minor () and Dana Sisak
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Dylan Minor: Harvard Business School, Strategy Unit

No 16-040, Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School

Abstract: We experimentally study ways in which the social preferences of individuals and groups affect performance when faced with relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding workers tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish workers are nearly three times more likely to lead workers to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a team of workers has complex consequences for organizational performance.

Keywords: Social Preferences; Relative Performance; Collusion; Leadership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Do people who care about others cooperate more? Experimental evidence from relative incentive pay (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hbs:wpaper:16-040

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