A Hybrid Game with Conditional and Unconditional Veto Power

Werner Güth (), Maria Levati, Natalia Montinari () and Chiara Nardi

No 2014:16, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responder's conflict payoff. Neither variation affects behavior: proposers always favor informed responders, who frequently accept minimal offers.

Keywords: Ultimatum; Yes/No game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2014-05-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: A hybrid game with conditional and unconditional veto power (2014)
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