Efficiency Enhancing Taxation in Two-sided Markets
Hans Jarle Kind,
Marko Koethenbuerger and
Guttorm Schjelderup
No 2008/1, Discussion Papers from Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science
Abstract:
This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or positive specific taxes.
Keywords: Market Structure and Pricing; Efficiency; Optimal Taxation; Incidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 D43 H21 H22 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2008-01-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic, nep-net, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)
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Journal Article: Efficiency enhancing taxation in two-sided markets (2008) 
Working Paper: Efficiency Enhancing Taxation in Two-sided Markets (2008) 
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