Predating Predators: An experimental Study

Judith Avrahami, Yaakov Kareev and Werner G³th
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Judith Avrahami: The Goldie Rotman Center for Cognitive Science and Education, and The Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
Yaakov Kareev: The Goldie Rotman Center for Cognitive Science and Education, and The Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
Werner G³th: Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Unit, Jena, Germany
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Güth ()

Homo Oeconomicus, 2001, vol. 18, 337-351

Abstract: The phenomenon of predating predators requires at least three specimens to whom we refer as players 1, 2, and 3. Player 1 has simply to guess nature when trying to find food. Player 2 is hunting player 1 in the hope that 1 is well fed but must also avoid being hunted by player 3. One major motivation is to test three benchmark solutions (uniformly perfect, impulse balance and payoff balance equilibrium) in such a complex strategic setting. In the experiment three participants repeatedly pay the game (partner design) which allows us to test whether certain types of behavior are just inclinations or stable patterns which survive leaning and experience

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:337-351

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