Reflections on Equilibrium: Ideal Rationality and Analytic Decomposition of Games

Siegfried Berninghaus, Werner G³th and Hartmut Kliemt
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Siegfried Berninghaus: Institut WIOR, Universitõt Karlsruhe, Rechenzentrum, Karlsruhe, Germany
Werner G³th: Max Planck Institute for Research, into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Güth ()

Homo Oeconomicus, 2003, vol. 20, 257-302

Abstract: Taking seriously the philosophical foundations of classical strategic theories of choice-making we scrutinize to what extent planning on equilibrium strategies can be justified "eductively" among rational players and how this can be utilizes to analyze games by their "game-like" sub-structures, in particular by their sub-games in the extensive and by their cells in (agent) normal form. "Material" principles of rational choice and "formal" methodological requirements of consistent theory of formation are considered and it is claimed that there can be consistent "conventions of rationality!. Which of the possible conventions will prevail and definde rationality may depend though on which of the theories of ideal rationality will be absorbed among rational agents. Once established "conventional rationality" can lead to unique solutions for strategic games.

Date: 2003
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