Labor Policy and Investment

John Budd and Yijiang Wang

Working Papers from Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus)

Abstract: Policy debates over proposed legislative labor policy changes include contentions that business investment will negatively respond to labor laws that favor labor. Research on labor policy, however, often assumes that investment is fixed. We present a sequential bargaining model in which labor policies that increase labor's bargaining power and reduce management's options during strikes are predicted to reduce investment. Using provincial data on investment for 1967 to 1999, a strike replacement ban and protections for workers who refuse to handle struck work are estimated to reduce new investment, especially within the first few years after the policy change.

JEL-codes: G31 J58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.legacy-irc.csom.umn.edu/RePEC/hrr/papers/0502.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to www.legacy-irc.csom.umn.edu:443 (Bad file descriptor) (http://www.legacy-irc.csom.umn.edu/RePEC/hrr/papers/0502.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.legacy-irc.csom.umn.edu/RePEC/hrr/papers/0502.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrr:papers:0502

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mary Helen Walker ().