Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism

Maria Levati and Ro'i Zultan

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. Our approach avoids most drawbacks of the traditional procedures because it relies on endogenous cycle lengths, which are defined by the number of contributors a player waits before committing to a further contribution. Based on hypothetical distributions of randomly generated contribution sequences, we provide strong evidence for conditionally cooperative behavior. Moreover, notwithstanding a decline in contributions, conditional cooperation is found to be stable over time.

Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Published in Games 2011, 2(1), 1-15.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (2011)
Working Paper: Cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism (2009)
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