Oil and the duration of dictatorships

Jesus Crespo Cuaresma, Harald Oberhofer and Paul Raschky

Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck

Abstract: This paper develops a simple model that analyses the relationship between a country's oil endowment and the duration of its autocratic leader. The dictator uses the rents from oil extraction for both personal gain and to pay-off potential opposition and chooses an optimal level of oil exploitation. A group of kingmakers, on the other side, decides whether to stage a coup d’´etat and establish a new dictator. The relationship between oil endowment and the duration of the dictatorial regime is modulated by the price of oil. Applying an empirical survival model on data for the duration of 106 dictatorships supports the predictions of the theoretical model.

Keywords: Natural resources; dictatorship; political economy; duration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-cdm, nep-ene and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Oil and the duration of dictatorships (2011)
Working Paper: Oil and the Duration of Dictatorships (2010)
Working Paper: Oil and the duration of dictatorships (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2008-24

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