Social norms, third-party observation and third-party reward

Matthias Sutter, Peter Lindner and Daniela Platsch ()

Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck

Abstract: This paper examines the influence of third-party observation and third-party reward on behavior in an experimental prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. Whereas the existing literature on third-party intervention as a means to sustain social norms has dealt almost exclusively with third-party punishment, we show that both third-party observation and third-party reward have positive effects on cooperation rates, compared to a treatment where no third party is involved. Third-party reward is more effective in increasing cooperation than third-party observation. However, rewards are given too late to prevent a steady downward trend of cooperation rates.

Keywords: Social norms; third-party reward; third-party observation; prisoner's dilemma experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25
Date: 2009-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2009-08

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