How Social Preferences Shape Incentives in (Experimental) Markets for Credence Goods
Rudolf Kerschbamer,
Matthias Sutter and
Uwe Dulleck
Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck
Abstract:
Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies caused by superior information of sellers about the surplus-maximizing quality. While standard theory predicts that equal mark-up prices solve the credence goods problem if customers can verify the quality received, experimental evidence indicates the opposite. We identify a lack of robustness with respect to heterogeneity in social preferences as a possible cause of this and conduct new experiments that allow for parsimonious identification of sellers' social preference types. Our results indicate that less than a fourth of the subjects behave in accordance with the standard assumption on preferences, the rest behaving either in line with other forms of selfish or in accordance with different variants of non- selfish social preferences. We discuss consequences of our findings for institutional design and agent selection.
Keywords: Credence Goods; Expert Services; Social Preferences; Distributional Preferences; Other-Regarding Preferences; Behavioral Economics; Experimental Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2015-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
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Journal Article: How Social Preferences Shape Incentives in (Experimental) Markets for Credence Goods (2017) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2015-04
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