Strategies of the Political Opposition

Amihai Glazer

No 60718, Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

Abstract: I consider the strategies that an opposition party can use against an incumbent party which controls the government. The focus is on strategies when citizens vote retrospectively (so that the incumbent's chance of winning re-election increases with his performance), and when citizens compare the estimated abilities of the candidates. In both cases, the equilibrium may have the opposition vote against all policies the government proposes.

Keywords: Political opposition; Reputation; Retrospective voting; Policy implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2007-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:irv:wpaper:060718

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