Psychological Pressure and the Right to Determine the Moves in Dynamic Tournaments: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment

Mark Kassis (), Sascha Schmidt (), Dominik Schreyer and Matthias Sutter
Additional contact information
Mark Kassis: WHU Vallendar

No 13628, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In this paper, we show that the right to determine the sequence of moves in a dynamic team tournament improves the chances of winning the contest. Because studying dynamic team tournaments – like R&D races – with interim feedback is difficult with company data, we examine decisions of highly paid professionals in soccer penalty shootouts and show that teams whose captains can decide about the shooting sequence are more likely to win the shootout. So, managerial decisions matter for outcomes of dynamic tournaments and we discuss potential reasons for this finding.

Keywords: dynamic tournament; sports professionals; psychological pressure; value of decision rights; penalty shoot-outs; behavioral economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D00 D81 D91 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2020-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-spo
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Published - published in: Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, 126, 278-287.

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https://docs.iza.org/dp13628.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments – evidence from a natural field experiment (2021)
Working Paper: Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments – Evidence from a natural field experiment (2020)
Working Paper: Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments – Evidence from a natural field experiment (2020)
Working Paper: Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments – Evidence from a natural field experiment (2020)
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