Performance Pay and Work Hours: US Survey Evidence

Benjamin Artz () and John Heywood
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Benjamin Artz: University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh

No 15412, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We examine the hypothesis that performance pay increases work hours. If performance pay incentivizes greater hours, this could cause the demonstrated link between performance pay and poorer worker health. Using US survey data, we confirm greater work hours and an increased likelihood of long working hours for performance pay workers. This remains in worker fixed effect estimates and in worker with employer fixed effect estimates. The magnitudes remain sufficiently large to support the potential role of long hours as an intermediary between performance pay and reduced worker health. Despite managers being the most likely to both receive performance pay and work long hours, we show this association largely reflects sorting and not the behavioral response evident for other workers.

Keywords: performance related pay; hours worked (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J22 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2022-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eff, nep-hrm and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Performance pay and work hours: US survey evidence (2024)
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