Studying Labor Market Institutions in the Lab: Minimum Wages, Employment Protection and Workfare
Armin Falk and
David B. Huffman ()
Additional contact information
David B. Huffman: University of Pittsburgh
No 2310, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
A central concern in economics is to understand the interplay between institutions and labor markets. In this paper we argue that laboratory experiments are a powerful tool for studying labor market institutions. One of the most important advantages is the ability to implement truly exogenous institutional change, in order to make clear causal inferences. We exemplify the usefulness of lab experiments by surveying evidence from three studies, each of which investigates a different, crucial labor market institution: minimum wage laws, employment protection legislation and workfare.
Keywords: employment protection legislation; laboratory experiments; minimum wages; workfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I38 J3 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2006-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-lab and nep-law
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Citations:
Published - published in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2007, 163 (1), 30-45
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Journal Article: Studying Labor Market Institutions in the Lab: Minimum Wages, Employment Protection, and Workfare (2007) 
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