Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Work Absence among Managers in a German Company

Christian Pfeifer ()

No 7088, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Questions about compensation structures and incentive effects of pay-for-performance components are important for firms' Human Resource Management as well as for economics in general and labor economics in particular. This paper provides scarce insider econometric evidence on the structure and the incentive effects of fixed base salaries, paid bonuses, and agreed bonuses under a Management-by-Objectives (MBO) incentive scheme. Six years of personnel data of 177 managers in a German company are analyzed. The main findings are: (1) base salaries increase significantly with age, whereas bonuses decrease with age; (2) larger agreed bonuses are correlated with fewer absent working days.

Keywords: wages; insider econometrics; absenteeism; bonus; effort; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J22 J24 J31 J33 M12 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2012-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-hrm and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 2014, 61 (5), 523-536

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Related works:
Journal Article: Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Work Absence among Managers in a German Company (2014)
Working Paper: Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Work Absence among Managers in a German Company (2012)
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