Cheap Talk and Secret Intentions in a Public Goods Experiments

Werner Güth (), Maria Levati and Torsten Weiland

No 2007-048, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted to choose as actual contribution either current alternative. Based on the two types of choice data for a partners and a perfect strangers condition, we confirm that final outcomes strongly depend on the matching protocol. As to choice dynamics, we distinguish different types of adaptations.

Keywords: Public goods game; Cheap talk communication; Real-time protocol (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-08-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-048

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