Listen: I am angry! An experiment comparing ways of revealing emotions

Werner Güth () and Maria Levati

No 2007-096, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: We report on an experiment designed to explore whether allowing individuals to voice their anger prevents costly punishment. For this sake, we use an ultimatum minigame and distinguish two treatments: one in which responders can only accept or reject the other, and the other in which they can also scold the proposer. By an unannounced successive two-person public goods game, with either the same partner or a different one, we additionally explore how "having a voice" affects later behavior. The evidence supports the conclusion that voicing one's outrage crowds out the need to harm oneself and the other. Yet, this emotional reaction does not lead to increased future cooperation.

Keywords: Ultimatum bargaining; Public goods game; Outrage; Punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-12-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-pbe and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-096

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