Effects of Profitable Downsizing on Collective Bargaining

Sven Fischer (), Werner Güth () and Christoph Köhler
Additional contact information
Sven Fischer: Department of Economics, University College London
Christoph Köhler: Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Institute for Sociology, Economic and Social Structure Group

No 2008-011, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: We experimentally test how acceptance thresholds react to the decision of the proposer in a three party ultimatum game to exclude one of two responders with veto power from the game. We elicit responder acceptance thresholds in case the proposer decides to exclude one of them, what increases the available pie, and in case he doesn't exclude him despite strong monetary incentives. We ?nd that on the aggregate level the proposer's decision has no effect on acceptance thresholds. However, if the proposer excludes one responder, the distribution of thresholds becomes bimodal, indicating a polarization in behavior.

Keywords: bargaining; experiment; labor markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-02-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-lab
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://oweb.b67.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2008/wp_2008_011.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-011

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Markus Pasche ().