Satisficing in strategic environments: a theoretical approach and experimental evidence

Werner Güth (), Maria Levati and Matteo Ploner

No 2008-078, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the concept of satisficing, which does not exclude (prior-free) optimality but includes it as a border case. We also review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach.

Keywords: Strategic interaction; Satisficing behavior; Bounded rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cse, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Satisficing in strategic environments: A theoretical approach and experimental evidence (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-078

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