Rules (of Bidding) to Generate Equal Stated Profits - An Axiomatic Approach -

Werner Güth ()

No 2010-014, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without enforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking and rather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it. Our axiomatic approach is based on envy-free net trades according to bids which, together with the equality requirement, characterize the first-prize auction and fair division game.

Keywords: Auctions; Fair Division; Procedural fairness; Envy-Freeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D63 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Journal Article: Rules (of Bidding) to Generate Equal Stated Profits: An Axiomatic Approach (2011)
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