Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment

Werner Güth (), Maria Levati and Matteo Ploner

No 2010-073, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design varies ownership of the single indivisible commodity (an outside seller versus collective ownership) and the price rule (first versus second price). Our results indicate more equilibrium behavior under the procedurally fair price rule, what, however, does not completely crowd out equality and efficiency seekin

Keywords: Auctions; Fair Division Games; Procedural fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Does Procedural Fairness Crowd Out Other-Regarding Concerns? A Bidding Experiment (2013)
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