Bargaining and Negotiations What should experimentalists explore more thoroughly?

Werner Güth ()

No 2011-012, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: A long time ago most economists would have limited themselves to stating that agreements should be individually rational and efficient and that selecting a specific agreement from that set depends on bargaining and negotiation power whatever that may be. Nowadays hardly any economist will argue that way. The change has been brought about by the strategic approach to bargaining and cooperation and the parallel experimental studies of bargaining and negotiation. When arguing what should be explored more thoroughly, we will point out directions where previous efforts may have been misdirected, where importing new methods may be helpful or even needed, and where new research questions need to be asked and answered.

Keywords: (un)bounded rationality; (non-)cooperative game theory; bargaining and negotiation (theory and experiments) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 C92 C93 D63 D64 D71 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-012

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