Procedurally Fair Provision of Public Projects An axiomatic characterization

Werner Güth () and Hartmut Kliemt

No 2011-016, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants veto power to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of bidding processes to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a "productive state". At heart of such procedures is the determination of payments for all possible bid vectors such that equal "profits" according to bids emerge. Along with other intuitive requirements this characterizes procedurally fair bidding rules for advantageous projects of a collectivity.

Keywords: Unanimity in Collective Decision Making; Buchanan; Wicksell (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D63 D71 H4 H61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-pol and nep-ppm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-016

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