Collectively Ranking Candidates - An Axiomatic Approach -

Werner Güth ()

No 2011-020, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: Different evaluators typically disagree how to rank different candidates since they care more or less for the various qualities of the candidates. It is assumed that all evaluators submit vector bids assigning a monetary bid for each possible rank order. The rules must specify for all possible vectors of such vector bids the collectively binding rank order of candidates and the "payments" for this bid vector and its implied rank order. Three axioms uniquely define the "procedurally fair" ranking rules. We finally discuss how our approach can be adjusted to situations where one wants to rank only acceptable candidates.

Keywords: social ranking; fairness; fair game forms; objective equality; mechanism desig; committee decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-020

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