Fairness That Money Can Buy - Procedural Egalitarianism in Practice

Werner Güth () and Hartmut Kliemt

No 2013-003, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: We suggest that procedures of monetarized bidding can facilitate co-operation in Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects without crowding out communitarian faculties of "self-governance". Axioms securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations are introduced. They guarantee that all realized changes of a status quo are in an "objective" (pecuniary) sense equally advantageous for all members of the community. Some empirical evidence that procedurally fair bidding can promote communitarian co-operation rather than crowding it out, is presented. The practical scope and limits of procedural egalitarianism need further empirical exploration, though.

Keywords: Fair Procedures; Egalitarian Mechanisms; Unanimity; Constitutional Political Economy; Non-State Communities; Governing the Commons; Crowding out (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D63 D71 H4 H61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-hpe and nep-ppm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Fairness That Money Can Buy. Procedural Egalitarianism in Practice (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2013-003

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