Trust in generosity: An experiment of the repeated Yes-No game

Werner Güth () and Hironori Otsubo

No 2014-024, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: This paper reports results of a 100-round Yes-No game experiment conducted under the random matching protocol. In contrast to ultimatum bargaining, the responder in the Yes-No game decides whether to accept without knowing the proposer's offer. Although both games have the same solution outcome (i.e., the proposer offers the smallest possible amount and the responder accepts), the set of equilibria of the ultimatum bargaining game is rather large whereas the equilibrium of the Yes-No game is essentially unique. Avrahami et al. (2013) found an immediate convergence to proposers offering an equal split in their repeated ultimatum bargaining experiment. Our main interest is which dynamics emerge when proposers and responders repeatedly play the Yes-No game. We found neither convergence to offering an equal split nor to the solution outcome. Most participants display a surprising constancy of behavior but the categories of behavior are rather rich.

Keywords: Yes-No game; Repetition; Learning; Veto power; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Journal Article: Trust in generosity: an experiment of the repeated Yes–No game (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-024

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