Asymmetric and endogenous within-group communication in competitive coordination games

Timothy Cason, Roman Sheremeta and Jingjing Zhang

Experimental Economics, 2017, vol. 20, issue 4, No 10, 946-972

Abstract: Abstract Within-group communication in competitive coordination games has been shown to increase competition between groups and lower efficiency. This study further explores potentially harmful effects of communication, by addressing the questions of (1) asymmetric communication and (2) the endogenous emergence of communication. Our theoretical analysis provides testable hypotheses regarding the effect of communication on competitive behavior and efficiency. We test these predictions using a laboratory experiment. The experiment shows that although asymmetric communication is not as harmful as symmetric communication, it leads to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency relative to the case when neither group can communicate. Moreover, groups vote to endogenously establish communication channels even though they would earn higher payoffs if jointly they chose to restrict within-group communication.

Keywords: Between-group competition; Within-group competition; Communication; Coordination; Contests; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Asymmetric and Endogenous Within-Group Communication in Competitive Coordination Games (2015)
Working Paper: Asymmetric and Endogenous Within-Group Communication in Competitive Coordination Games (2015)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-017-9519-2

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