Balancing control and delegation: the moderating influence of managerial discretion on performance effects of board monitoring and CEO human capital
Yuliya Ponomareva ()
Additional contact information
Yuliya Ponomareva: Ramon Llull University
Journal of Management & Governance, 2019, vol. 23, issue 1, No 9, 195-225
Abstract:
Abstract Building on research within corporate governance and strategic management, this paper explores how managerial discretion stemming from managerial task environment influences the balance between controlling and enabling managerial decision-making. Two sets of alternative hypotheses about the moderating effects of managerial discretion on the performance effects of board monitoring and CEO human capital were formulated. The results indicate partial support for governance-driven explanation showing that the association between board monitoring and market-based performance is strongest in environments characterized by high levels of managerial discretion. The findings also show that CEO human capital is positively associated with market-based performance in low-discretion environments, while in high-discretion environments this relationship turns negative. The central contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that managerial discretion is a useful tool to explain the balance between controlling and enabling managerial decision making.
Keywords: Corporate governance; Board of directors; Managerial discretion; CEO (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10997-018-9423-y Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:23:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s10997-018-9423-y
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... 29/journal/10997/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s10997-018-9423-y
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Management & Governance is currently edited by Lino Cinquini
More articles in Journal of Management & Governance from Springer, Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().