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Contracting and Performance in Agencies: A Question of Control, Dialogue or Autonomy?

Bente Bjørnholt () and Heidi Salomonsen ()

Public Organization Review, 2015, vol. 15, issue 4, 509-530

Abstract: The article investigates whether contracting process affects goal attainment in internal contracts. Based on literature on contracting and performance management, we deduce four hypotheses concerning contracting processes and goal attainment. The hypotheses are tested by studying contracts from all Danish agencies together with a survey and interviews with the heads of agencies. We find that dialogue and some autonomy in the contracting process increase goal attainment if balanced with hierarchical control. We also find that agreement between agencies and departments on performance demands and assessment criteria positively affect goal attainment. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Contracting; Agencies; Performance; Autonomy; Control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:porgrv:v:15:y:2015:i:4:p:509-530

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DOI: 10.1007/s11115-014-0286-7

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