Does social trust determine the size of the welfare state? Evidence using historical identification

Christian Bjørnskov and Gert Svendsen

Public Choice, 2013, vol. 157, issue 1, 269-286

Abstract: Most modern welfare states offer an extensive array of services and benefits that are wholly or partly financed by tax revenue. One missing link in explaining the long-run sustainability of such comprehensive welfare states could be the already-existing stock of trust. Indeed, our cross-country results suggest that trust determines the size of welfare states as well as three features that are arguably necessary for their preservation: high levels of political confidence, strong legal institutions protecting private property rights, and low levels of bureaucratic corruption. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Keywords: Social trust; Welfare state; US immigrants; Historical identification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (71)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-9944-x

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