EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Impact of natural disaster on public sector corruption

Eiji Yamamura (cyl02111@nifty.com)

Public Choice, 2014, vol. 161, issue 3, 385-405

Abstract: This paper uses inter-country panel data from 1990 through 2010 to examine how the occurrence of natural disasters affects corruption within the public sector. For a closer analysis, disaster is classified into various categories, including general floods, other floods, tropical storms, other storms, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and landslides. Furthermore, this paper explores whether natural disasters have different impacts on corruption levels in developed and developing countries. The study reveals a number of novel findings. (1) Natural disasters that cause substantial damage increase public sector corruption in both developing and developed countries. (2) Natural disasters have a greater impact on public sector corruption in developed countries than in developing countries. (3) In developed countries, natural disaster frequency has a significant impact on the level of corruption. Hence, foreseeable disasters increase corruption in general. In developed countries, an incentive may exist to live within disaster-prone areas because of the potential for disaster compensation payments. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Corruption; Institution; Disasters; Risk; D73; D81; Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-014-0154-6 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Impact of natural disaster on public sector corruption (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Impact of natural disaster on public sector corruption (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:161:y:2014:i:3:p:385-405

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-014-0154-6

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla (sonal.shukla@springer.com) and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (indexing@springernature.com).

 
Page updated 2024-12-30
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:161:y:2014:i:3:p:385-405