Collective action: fifty years later

Todd Sandler

Public Choice, 2015, vol. 164, issue 3, 195-216

Abstract: This paper presents a retrospective view of Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action. The paper’s primary purpose is to investigate the validity of Olson’s propositions concerning group size, group composition, and institutional design. This purpose is accomplished by drawing on the literature and the paper’s game-theoretic representations. Key considerations behind the validity of his propositions concern benefit rivalry, the aggregation technology, strategic assumptions, and participation costs. The difference between public good and commons games is also an essential consideration. Generally, Olson’s propositions fare best for benefit rivalry, a summation aggregator, Nash behavior, and positive participation costs. Because his propositions are true in many important real-world situations, the book remains highly relevant. Efforts to find exceptions to Olson’s propositions have served to further our understanding of collective action. Copyright The Author(s) 2015

Keywords: Collective action; Exploitation hypothesis; Selective incentives; Public goods; Commons; D70; H41; D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-015-0252-0

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