Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes

Mostapha Diss and Ahmed Doghmi ()

Public Choice, 2016, vol. 169, issue 1, No 5, 97-116

Abstract: Abstract The goal of this paper is to propose a comparison of four multi-winner voting rules, k-Plurality, k-Negative Plurality, k-Borda, and Bloc. These four election methods are extensions of usual scoring rules designed for electing a single winner and are compared on the basis of two criteria. The first comparison is based on the Condorcet committee efficiency which is defined as the conditional probability for a peculiar voting rule to select the Condorcet committee, provided that such a committee exists. The second comparison is based on the likelihood of two paradoxes of committee elections: the Prior Successor Paradox and the Leaving Member Paradox, which occur when a member of an elected committee exits. Aside from these two extensions, this paper is one of the very rare contributions giving exact results under the Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) condition for the case of four candidates.

Keywords: Multi-winner voting rules; Committee; Condorcet committee efficiency; Paradoxes; Probability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Working Paper: Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes (2016)
Working Paper: Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes (2016)
Working Paper: Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes (2016)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0376-x

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