Self-imposition of public oversight

Mark Gradstein ()
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Mark Gradstein: Ben Gurion University

Public Choice, 2018, vol. 175, issue 1, No 5, 95-109

Abstract: Abstract We argue that policymakers may have personal interests in policy restraints channeled through public oversight. Self-imposition of public oversight can be beneficial for the policymaker because it may help alleviate the dynamic inconsistency problem that she otherwise faces. In the setting studied herein, self-imposed public oversight takes the form of a ceiling on tax rates, which can be overridden only with the legislature’s consent. Such a mechanism is shown to credibly commit the policymaker to future tax restraint, thus inducing larger productive effort.

Keywords: Legislative oversight; Tax caps; Dynamic inconsistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0515-7

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