Candidate valence in a spatial model with entry

Xefteris, Dimitrios

Candidate valence in a spatial model with entry

Public Choice, 2018, vol. 176, issue 3, No 1, 359 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies electoral competition between two purely office-motivated and heterogeneous (in terms of valence) established candidates when the entry of a lesser-valence third candidate is anticipated. In this model, when the valence asymmetries among candidates are not very large, an essentially unique equilibrium always exists and it is such that: (a) the two established candidates employ pure strategies, (b) the high-valence established candidate offers a more moderate platform than the low-valence established candidate, (c) the entrant locates between the two established candidates and nearer to the established high-valence candidate and, surprisingly, (d) both established candidates receive equal vote-shares.

Keywords: Electoral competition; Entry; Candidate valence; Spatial model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Candidate valence in a spatial model with entry (2016)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0549-x

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