The effect of democratic decision-making on investment in reputation

Ruth Ben-Yashar (), Miriam Krausz () and Shmuel Nitzan
Additional contact information
Ruth Ben-Yashar: Bar Ilan University
Miriam Krausz: Ashkelon Academic College

Public Choice, 2018, vol. 177, issue 1, No 8, 155-164

Abstract: Abstract Students wish to increase the probability of being admitted to a prestigious school. Job candidates are interested in the probability of getting desirable employment. Defendants are concerned about the probability of being acquitted. In all such binary settings, the probability of the desirable outcome to individuals can be affected by their reputations. Applying the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem framework in which decision makers are assumed to be non-strategic, we focus on how the nature of the applied decision-making rule affects the individuals’ incentives to invest in improvement of their reputations. Our main results establish that, within the family of democratic majority voting rules, simple majority rule (a rule of unanimous consent) ensures that the marginal productivity of reputation is largest (smallest) and that it increases (decreases) with the size of the decision-making committee.

Keywords: Decision-making structure; Investment in reputation; Simple majority; Unanimous consent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: The Effect of Democratic Decision Making on Investment in Reputation (2017)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0595-4

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