Psychological game theory in public choice

Gregory DeAngelo () and Bryan McCannon
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Gregory DeAngelo: Claremont Graduate University

Public Choice, 2020, vol. 182, issue 1, No 9, 159-180

Abstract: Abstract We present the basic framework of psychological game theory (PGT) and linkages to the public choice literature. The distinction between PGT and other game-theoretic frameworks rests on the inclusion of beliefs about strategies directly within the players’ objective functions. Thus, a natural extension of PGT includes the consideration of non-monetary drivers of behavior. We provide examples of applications in public choice.

Keywords: Psychological game theory; Public choice; Non-monetary incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H0 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00676-6

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