Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting

Daniela Bubboloni (), Mostapha Diss and Michele Gori ()
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Daniela Bubboloni: Università degli Studi di Firenze
Michele Gori: Università degli Studi di Firenze

Public Choice, 2020, vol. 183, issue 1, No 8, 185 pages

Abstract: Abstract Committee selection rules are procedures selecting sets of candidates (committees) of a given size on the basis of the preferences of the voters. Two natural extensions of the well-known single-winner Simpson voting rule to the multiwinner setting have been identified in the literature. We propose an in-depth analysis of those committee selection rules, assessing and comparing them with respect to several desirable properties, among which are unanimity, fixed majority, non-imposition, stability, local stability, Condorcet consistency, some kinds of monotonicity, resolvability and consensus committee. We also investigate the probability that the two methods are resolute and suffer the reversal bias, the Condorcet loser paradox and the leaving member paradox. We compare the results obtained with the ones related to further well-known committee selection rules. The probability assumption on which our results are based is the widely used Impartial Anonymous Culture.

Keywords: Multiwinner elections; Committee selection rule; Simpson voting rule; Paradoxes; Probability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting (2020)
Working Paper: Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting (2020)
Working Paper: Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting (2018)
Working Paper: Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting (2018)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00692-6

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