Fiscal performance and the re-election of finance ministers–evidence from the Swiss cantons

Aurélia Buchs () and Nils Soguel
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Aurélia Buchs: University of Lausanne

Public Choice, 2022, vol. 191, issue 1, No 3, 49 pages

Abstract: Abstract Using data from 225 cantonal government elections over the 1980–2019 period in Switzerland, we estimate the effect of fiscal performance on the vote share of finance ministers seeking re-election. Our estimations show that finance ministers benefit statistically and electorally from balancing fiscal accounts and presenting budget surpluses. Improving the fiscal balance by 1000 Swiss francs per inhabitant in the pre-election year raises the electoral result of a finance minister by 1.4–5.4 percentage points from the vote share of her previous election. We present evidence for politician-specific monitoring: the finance minister—in contrast to the spending ministers—seems to be the sole member of government who benefits, electorally, from debt reduction. Correcting for possible selection phenomena, our results suggest that the electoral effect of fiscal performance may not be caused by a selection bias but rather by the office of the finance ministry itself.

Keywords: Fiscal performance; Electoral accountability; Finance minister; Multi-seat majority elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E62 H72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-021-00949-z

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