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Split Cycle: a new Condorcet-consistent voting method independent of clones and immune to spoilers

Wesley H. Holliday () and Eric Pacuit ()
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Wesley H. Holliday: University of California
Eric Pacuit: University of Maryland

Public Choice, 2023, vol. 197, issue 1, No 1, 62 pages

Abstract: Abstract We propose a Condorcet-consistent voting method that we call Split Cycle. Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods satisfying the anti-vote-splitting criterion of independence of clones. In this family, only Split Cycle satisfies a new criterion we call immunity to spoilers, which concerns adding candidates to elections, as well as the known criteria of positive involvement and negative involvement, which concern adding voters to elections. Thus, in contrast to other clone-independent methods, Split Cycle mitigates both “spoiler effects” and “strong no show paradoxes.”

Keywords: Voting methods; Social choice theory; Condorcet consistency; Spoiler effects; Independence of clones; Strong no show paradox; 91B12; 91B14; 91B10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01042-3

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