Credit for me but not for thee: the effects of the Illinois rate cap

J. Brandon Bolen (), Gregory Elliehausen () and Thomas W. Miller ()
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J. Brandon Bolen: Mississippi College, School of Business
Gregory Elliehausen: Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System
Thomas W. Miller: Mississippi State University

Public Choice, 2023, vol. 197, issue 3, No 6, 397-420

Abstract: Abstract On March 23, 2021, Illinois imposed an all-in rate cap of 36% APR. We use credit bureau data for Illinois and its neighboring state, Missouri, a state without any legislated interest-rate cap, to estimate the effects of the Illinois rate cap on unsecured installment loans. Using difference-in-differences-in-differences estimation, we find that the interest-rate cap decreased the number of loans to subprime borrowers by 38% and increased the average loan size to subprime borrowers by 35%. Responses to a survey of small-dollar-credit borrowers in Illinois who lost credit access suggest the interest-rate cap worsened the financial well-being of many of these borrowers. Legislators motivated by genuine public interest rationales might not recognize the harmful consequences of their actions for these higher-risk borrowers with few credit alternatives. Legislators might also be motivated by the benefits of the interest-rate cap for lower-risk borrowers. The interest-rate cap increased the number of loans to prime borrowers by 16% and the average loan size to prime borrowers by 7%.

Keywords: Small-dollar credit; Interest rate cap; Installment lending; D04; D12; G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01087-4

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