Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution

Timur Kuran

Public Choice, 1989, vol. 61, issue 1, 74 pages

Abstract: A feature shared by certain major revolutions is that they were not anticipated. Here is an explanation, which hinges on the observation that people who come to dislike their government are apt to hide their desire for change as long as the opposition seems weak. Because of this preference falsification, a government that appears unshakeable might see its support crumble following a slight surge in the opposition's apparent size, caused by events insignificant in and of themselves. Unlikely though the revolution may have appeared in foresight, it will in hindsight appear inevitable because its occurrence exposes a panoply of previously hidden conflicts. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Date: 1989
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00116762

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