The Electoral Budget Cycle

Andre Blais and Richard Nadeau

Public Choice, 1992, vol. 74, issue 4, 389-403

Abstract: This article begins with a review of the now substantial literature on the thesis that politicians manipulate governmental outputs so as to favor their chances of reelection. It concludes that while this "electoral cycle" thesis was initially overstated by its proponents, it retains more plausibility than recent critics have allowed. This conclusion is then demonstrated through an analysis of expenditures by the ten provincial governments in Canada between 1951 and 1984. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1992
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (101)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:74:y:1992:i:4:p:389-403

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().