Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining

Martin Kocher, Odile Poulsen and Daniel Zizzo

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We assess the extent of preferences for employment in a collective wage bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. We vary the size of the union and introduce a treatment mechanism transforming the voting game into an individual allocation task. Our results show that highly productive workers do not take employment of low productive workers into account when making wage proposals, regardless of whether insiders determine the wage or all workers. The level of pro-social preferences is small in the voting game, while it increases as the game is transformed into an individual allocation task. We interpret this as an accountability effect.

Keywords: social preferences; wage bargaining; accountability; collective decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D71 J51 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-hrm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining (2017)
Working Paper: Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenec:14039

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