Macroeconomic Determinants of Contingent Protection: The Case of the European Union

Becker Bettina and Theuringer Martin ()
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Becker Bettina: Institute for Economic Policy, Department of Economics at the University of Cologne, Pohligstrasse 1, D - 50969 Köln
Theuringer Martin: Institute for Economic Policy, Department of Economics at the University of Cologne, Pohligstrasse 1, D - 50969 Köln

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 2001, vol. 50, issue 3, 350-374

Abstract: Contingent Protection, and in particular Antidumping (AD), has grown to become an important trade restricting device in the European Union (EU). This paper analyses whether internal and external macroeconomic pressure may contribute to explain the variations in the intensity of AD policy in the EU. The empirical analysis shows that the filing activity is inversely related to the domestic macroeconomic situation. This result suggests that AD is more a tool of protectionism rather than an instrument to countervail alleged unfair import competition.

Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2001-0307

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