Institutionelle Alternativen in der Europäischen Union: Das Beispiel des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspaktes

Ohr Renate () and Schmidt André ()
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Ohr Renate: Universität Göttingen, Volkswirtschaftliches Seminar, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073 Göttingen
Schmidt André: Universität Göttingen, Volkswirtschaftliches Seminar, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073 Göttingen

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 2006, vol. 55, issue 2, 127-149

Abstract: The Stability and Growth Pact is one of the constituent pillars of the European Monetary Union. Though, meanwhile it is obvious that it will not be able to limit fiscal deficits of the member states. For this reason in this paper Coase′s thinking in institutional alternatives is applied to find a better way to increase the incentives for more fiscal stability. We present and discuss tradable deficit permits comprising market-orientated incentives for fiscal stability. It is shown that tradable deficit permits are superior from a politico-economical view as well as with regard to allocative efficiency.

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2006-0202

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