Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams
Roland Kirstein and
Robert D. Cooter
No 7001, FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management
Abstract:
Compared to budget-balanced Sharing contracts, Anti-Sharing may improve the efficiency of teams. The Anti-Sharer collects a fixed payment from all team members; he receives the actual output and pays out its value to them. If a team members becomes Anti-Sharer, he will be unproductive in equilibrium. Hence, internal Anti-Sharing fails to yield the first-best outcome. Anti-Sharing is more likely to yield a higher team profit than Sharing, the larger the team, the curvature of the production function, or the marginal effort cost. Sharing is more likely to be better, the greater the marginal product, the cross-partials of the production function, or the curvature of the effort cost.
Keywords: Budget-breaker; supermodularity; constrained efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D23 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2007-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-mac
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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