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Details about Prof. Dr. Roland Kirstein
Prof. Dr. Roland Kirstein edits the NEP report on Collective Decision-Making and the NEP report on Intellectual Property Rights .
Access statistics for papers by Prof. Dr. Roland Kirstein.
Last updated 2008-05-05. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service .
Short-id: pki49
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Journal Articles
Working Papers
2008
Bayesianische Steuerbehörden und das Tax Payer Puzzle
FEMM Working Papers, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management
The “Rainmaker’s Dilemma:” Bad Debt Loss Insurance in Settlement and Litigation
FEMM Working Papers, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management
Also in
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
2007
Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies
FEMM Working Papers, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management
Also in
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
Internationaler Müllhandel aus Sicht der ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts
FEMM Working Papers, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management
Iterative Reasoning in an Experimental "Lemons" Market
FEMM Working Papers, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management
Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams
FEMM Working Papers, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management See Also Journal Article in Economics Letters (2007)
2002
"Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation
Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics
Also in
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press View citations See Also Journal Article in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) (2004)
Undated
Anti-Sharing
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
Anti-Teilen in Teams
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
Bayesian Monitoring
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
Efficient Compensation for Employees' Inventions
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press See Also Journal Article in European Journal of Law and Economics (2006)
Effiziente Vergütung von Arbeitnehmererfindungen - Eine ökonomische Analyse einer deutschen Gesetzesreform
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
Eigennutz als Triebfeder des Wohlstands
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press View citations
Erzeugt der Europäische Verbraucherschutz Marktversagen? Eine informationsökonomische und empirische Analyse
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press View citations
Europäischer Verbraucherschutz - Ausdruck grenzenloser Regulierungswut oder sinnvoller Schutz für Käufer? Erkenntnisse aus einem Laborexperiment
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
Internationaler Müllhandel. Eine institutionenökonomische Analyse
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
Kommentar zu Günther H. Roth: Gläubigerschutz im Wettbewerb
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
Less Rationality, More Efficiency: a Laboratory Experiment on "Lemons" Markets
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press View citations
Ordnung
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
Self-interest, Social Wealth, and Competition as a Discovery Procedure
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
Störung der Vertragsparität
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
The New Basle Accord, Internal Ratings, and the Incentives of Banks
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press View citations See Also Journal Article in International Review of Law and Economics (2002)
The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
Warum Staaten Ökosteuern statt Lizenzen einführen, und wann das schlecht für die Wohlfahrt ist
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press View citations
Ökonomik der Kriminalität
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
Journal Articles
2007
Sharing and anti-sharing in teams
Economics Letters , 2007, 96 , (3), 351-356 See Also Working Paper (2007)
2006
Blair, R. D., and Cotter, T. F.: Intellectual Property: Economic and Legal Dimensions of Rights and Remedies
Journal of Economics , 2006, 89 , (1), 90-93
Dictators and Social Contracts
American Journal of Economics and Sociology , 2006, 65 , (4), 863-889
Efficient compensation for employees' inventions
European Journal of Law and Economics , 2006, 21 , (2), 129-148 See Also Working Paper
2004
"Third Party Contingency" Contracts in Settlement and Litigation
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) , 2004, 160 , (4), 555- View citations See Also Working Paper (2002)
2003
Government Incentives When Pollution Permits Are Durable Goods
Public Choice , 2003, 115 , (1-2), 163-83 View citations
2002
The new Basle Accord, internal ratings, and the incentives of banks
International Review of Law and Economics , 2002, 21 , (4), 393-412 See Also Working Paper
2000
Risk Neutrality and Strategic Insurance
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice , 2000, 25 , (2), 251-261 View citations
1997
Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance
International Review of Law and Economics , 1997, 17 , (4), 509-520 View citations